The Falklands/Malvinas War, Its Causes and Consequences

and Proposed Ideas for a Negotiated Settlement

Héctor Carlos Martínez, Asunción, May 15, 2000

susucot@pla.net.py

On April 2^nd. 1982 the world received the news that Argentine forces had landed on the Falkland islands. To most outsiders, this fact could have sounded like another crazy adventure from a crazy Latin American Dictator. This idea went through my mind at first, as I was recovering from the initial shock of having seen the headlines on a newspaper, after I got in the train for my daily trip to college. However, as most Argentines, I knew it was much more than that. It was a lengthy and complicated problem which had originated one hundred and forty nine years back. It was a “National Cause”, as I had learned at school, something which had been engraved in our national identity. Suddenly, I found I had so many questions that had to be answered. As the train was taking me to downtown Buenos Aires while I was trying to overcome this strange sensation of excitement and fear I realized that, in order to find the answers to all those questions, one day I would have to study the long and complicated history of the islands.

The Falkland islands or “islas Malvinas” in Spanish are indeed a group of about 420 islands of which 80 percent of the total surface of  6,200 square miles is composed by the two main islands, East Falkland (Isla Soledad) and West Falkland (Isla Gran Malvina). They are located between latitude 51° and 53°  south and longitude 57° and 62° west, about 400 miles east from the Argentine Patagonian coast (Etchebarne Bullrich). The subject of their discovery is still a controversy. Some sources have credited the Spaniards, the Dutch and the British with it. According to the Argentine war veterans site on the web, the first name given to the islands was “Sanson” by Spanish sailors in 1520. In 1594 the British sail through the islands and name them “Hawkins Maiden Land” and, in 1600, the Dutch produce the first documented discovery of the islands naming them “Sebaldine Islands”.  The most certain fact was that the islands belonged to the Spanish territories in the Americas and had been appearing in Spanish and Portuguese navigation charts since mid sixteen century (Argentine Malvinas on the Web).

Since the beginning, the islands suffered from their strategic location, close to the Cape of Horn, which communicates the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and from the continuous rivalry and wars between England, Spain and France.  As explained by Hastings and Jenkins: “Under the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 Spain’s control of her traditional territories in the Americas –which embraced the Falklands- was confirmed, but this appears to have done little to restrain English and French ambitions” (2). The first ones to try to establish a colony were the French. In 1764, a French nobleman Antoine de Boungainville, eager to revenge France’s loss of Québéc, establishes a foot on the islands and claims them for Louis XV, naming the settlement Port Louis. This action provokes a strong reaction from Spain. After some negotiations, the French return the islands in a ceremony in west Falkland in 1767 and the Spaniards change the colony name to Puerto Soledad (Hastings and Jenkins 2-3). The first Spanish Governor to the islands, Felipe Ruiz Puente, is designated that same year. Meanwhile, in 1765 John Byron lands on the islands founding Fort Egmont and proclaiming the islands British territory. An eventual condominium between the French and British is established for a time while no Spaniards had set foot on the islands. When the Spaniards discover the British settlement they force them to leave the islands (Argentine Malvinas on the Web). The French had started calling the islands “Malouines” because the settlers came from the colony of Saint Maló, and from this name derives “Malvinas” in Spanish. The British name “Falklands” comes from the British sailor John Strong who, in 1690, sails through the channel dividing the two main islands and calls it “Falkland Channel”.

In 1776, in order to strengthen her domains in South America against Portuguese expansionism and British incursions in the South Atlantic, Spain founds the “Viceroyalty of the River Plate” comprising what is today Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and parts of southern Brazil, Bolivia and Chile plus the south Atlantic islands. Buenos Aires is designated the capital city and the first Viceroy establishes there. As observed by Hastings and Jenkins, after another war between England and Spain both countries sign in 1790 the Nootka Sound Convention in which England formally renounced her colonial ambitions in South America and the islands adjacent (4). In spite of this new treaty, the tensions between Spain and England don’t disappear. England was a growing empire and a world power. She had acquired many colonies around the world and much of her wealth came from the trade with them. On the other side, Spain maintained a trade monopoly with her colonies in the Americas, vast amounts of territories with a growing population and many riches. This monopoly, together with the historical rivalry with Spain, was seen by England as a major obstacle for her colonial ambitions. The growing contraband between England and the Spanish colonies of the River Plate area didn’t seem enough and finally England made two military attempts to occupy Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807. On both occasions the British forces were expelled. However, the direct contact with the British plus the wealth coming from the contraband left a profound influence on the people of the River Plate area in their quest for independence. The opportunity came when, in 1810, because of the French occupation of Spain, many Spanish colonies revolted against the motherland. Among those was the Viceroyalty of the River Plate. England, of course, was happy to aid the Spanish colonies to become independent. When the United Provinces of the River Plate (that later would be called Argentina) became independent in 1816, England was among the first nations to recognize their independence and establish diplomatic and commercial ties. In 1825 England signs with Argentina a Treaty of Friendship and Trade in which, among many things, she implicitly recognizes Argentina’s territory. This treaty, however, didn’t refrain England from taking the Falklands by force from Argentina many years later. As explained in Malvinas or Falklands?, the main reason for the British occupation of the islands was their good natural harbor with a strategic location for world trade from the beginning of the 19^th. century till the beginning of the 20^th. By that time, neither the Suez or Panama canals existed. In 1848, the American annexation of California increased the trade in the Pacific Ocean. As the railroads didn’t exist in the U.S. or Canada, both countries couldn’t join their east and west coasts by land, increasing the sea traffic through the Cape of Horn. England, which was a world power, depended heavily on her vast fleet which guaranteed the trades with her colonies throughout the world. It was therefore necessary for her to control the key points of the sea trade. She achieved this by occupying strategic places like Cape  town,  which  was   the  passage  to  the  Indian  sea  and  Gibraltar  for   the  Mediterranean Sea  In   the Atlantic  she started positioning  herself   by the occupation  of  the  islands  of  Ascencion, St. Helen, Tristan  da Cunha, Diego Alvarez (Gough) and then the Falklands (Etchebarne Bullrich). The colonial ambitions and needs of the world power at the moment were the driving force that made England occupy the Falkland islands.

But, in the meantime, what was happening on the islands? In 1811, due to the growing independent atmosphere in the River Plate area, Spain decides to abandon the islands and they remain vacant. However, as described in Malvinas or Falklands?, they were a frequent stop for sailors from many nationalities, among them British and American, who went there to poach sea lions or to find shelter from the rough seas and repair their ships.  On November 6 1820, 4 years after becoming independent, Argentina formally took possession of the islands through an expedition commanded by the American officer David Jewett. Upon arriving to the islands Jewett proclaims the Argentine sovereignty on them.  This proclamation was published the following year on the papers “El Redactor” (Cádiz, Spain) and the “Times” of  London. No formal claim was done by any foreign government (Etchebarne Bullrich). In 1828, Argentina appoints her first Governor to the islands, Luis Vernet, who takes off to the islands to establish a colony. Once Governor Vernet was established there, one of the first things he does is to protect Argentina’s interests by trying to stop the foreign vessels which went there to poach sea lions.

In 1831, Governor Vernet captures the American vessels “Harriet”, “Superior” and “Breakwater” that had been poaching sea lions on the islands (the latter manages to escape). He arrives to Buenos Aires on the vessel “Harriet”. The owner of the ship, Mr. Davison, requests help from the American Consul in Buenos Aires. He wants to try Vernet in the U.S. for piracy. The American Consul George Slacun orders the American frigate “Lexinton” to Buenos Aires. The ship then leaves for the Falkland islands with Davison and her Commander Duncan. Upon arriving there, as explained by Hastings and Jenkins, Commander Duncan violently sacks the Argentine colony. He spiked the cannons, blew up the powder, took all the skins that had been confiscated and declared the islands “free of all government”. He arrested most of the settlers including Governor Vernet and took them to Montevideo , Uruguay (5).  This strange behavior clearly contradicted the American Monroe Doctrine, which acknowledged the independence of the Americas and was opposed to foreign intervention. Regrettably, the United States never explained to Argentina  the use of  force against a friendly country whose independence had previously acknowledged and with which had diplomatic and commercial ties. Argentina made a formal protest before the United States but it was fruitless. Another Governor, Juan Mestiver, was sent to the islands but he was murdered by the remaining settlers left by Duncan, some of whom were convicts. In the meantime, the British Admiralty had been informed of these events by the British Consul in Buenos Aires, Woodbine Parish. As described in The Battle for the Falklands, England decided to seize the opportunity. In January 1833 the British returned to the islands with two frigates, “Tyne” and “Clio” under the command of Captain James Onslow. He had been instructed to take the islands for Britain. Onslow found the Commander of an Argentine frigate, José María Pinedo, who had been sent there to restore order to the islands and defend them. Onslow ordered him to lower the Argentine flag and leave. Pinedo, outgunned and outnumbered, was forced to leave. A band of gauchos (Argentine cowboys) headed by Antonio Rivero resisted for some months but they were hunted down. Rivero was taken prisoner and sent to Montevideo (Hastings and Jenkins 5-6). With this event, the Argentine presence on the islands came to an end. This is the root of the 1982 war: the overtaking by force of a legitimate established government which had been recognized by both England and the United States. However, the causes of the war developed slowly in the years ahead.

Argentina, naturally, made a formal protest before Britain’s Foreign Office, which started a serial of denials, further claims and contacts that led nowhere. By mid 19^th. century Argentina was a vast country scarcely populated  and most of the southern Patagonian territory, roughly 40 percent of today’s Argentina, was still dominated by the indians. The development of the country was therefore a top priority for the various ruling administrations. On the other hand, Argentina was slowly becoming a de facto member of the British Commonwealth thanks to the treaty of 1825. These two reasons could explain why the conflict for the islands was somehow left aside, but never forgotten, for other priorities like the conquest of Patagonia, which added millions of square miles to the country, and the trade with England which made the Argentine economy grow dramatically. As described in Malvinas or Falklands?, by 1913 England exported 42 percent of her production, mostly manufactured goods, to Argentina while 58 percent of British imports, mostly raw materials like cotton, leather and meat, were coming from Argentina (Etchebarne Bullrich). On top of that, England made very important investments in Argentina like railroads, telephones, oil and gas exploration, etc. All these investments also brought a considerably immigration from England which influenced Argentina’s culture and society for decades. Sports like soccer, rugby, polo, rowing and tennis, in which Argentina still excels today, were widely practiced and many wealthy families sent their sons to pursue a higher education in England. Why didn’t Argentina take advantage of such a close relationship to resolve the conflict remains a mystery. It is quite likely that the ruling politicians and the growing wealthy class thought it was unnecessary to disrupt such a wonderful relationship. In spite of this fact, Argentina’s position remained the same and every now and then a claim was made before the Foreign Office. Regretfully, this close relationship wouldn’t last for long As argued in Malvinas or Falklands?, by the 1930’s this “idyllic situation” came to an end. Argentina, which was among the first economies of the world, started receiving millions of immigrants since the beginning of the century. Most of them came from Spain, Italy and Germany, countries in which the ideas of the “National Socialism” were very strong. It was natural that those ideas were brought to the new country by the incoming waves of immigrants. On the other hand, England signed in 1932 the Treaty of Ottawa in which she privileged the Commonwealth on trade issues leaving Argentina practically aside (Etchebarne Bullrich). By that time, a young Army Colonel, Juan Domingo Perón, was acquiring more and more influence in the Argentine politics. He had been posted to Italy as a Military Attaché and had become a big admirer of Mussolini and his nationalistic ideas. Perón was also a very clever and charismatic leader who took advantage of the growing discontent among the millions of Argentine workers to become Argentina’s President in 1945 and 1951. Under Perón, Argentina’s prosperity started vanishing because of the implementation of his nationalistic policies.On the other hand, his government started courting the Axis powers. The latter, of course, didn’t benefit Argentina’s already diminished bilateral relationship with England. Another important consequence of these nationalistic ideas was that the recovery of the Falkland islands became a matter of national policy and remained like that since then.

In 1946, for the inauguration of the first period of sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Argentina presented her first international claim regarding the sovereignty dispute on the islands and subsequently did the same on the following years (Argentine Malvinas on the Web). However, practically nothing was achieved. England kept rejecting Argentina’s requests for diplomatic negotiations. The main reason for this, I believe, was that after World War II the British Empire started disintegrating. Colony after colony sought its independence, sometimes through a bloody armed struggle, and England could scarcely do anything but finally set them free. This sense of a retreating colonial power who once ruled the world together with the fact that the United States became the leading world superpower must have made a big dent on the British self esteem and national pride. It is quite understandable that England would try to hold to her overseas domains as much as possible while also keeping a worldwide military presence as a “bargaining chip” in international affairs during the Cold War. As explained in The Battle for the Falklands,

By the end of thirteen years of conservative rule in 1964, the majors British possessions in Africa and Asia were independent or becoming so. Yet the military bases designed to defend them were still in place… Tories who had resented the pace of imperial retreat now fought, from the opposition benches. To maintain the military umbrella. Such MP’s argued that a reduced empire did not entail a reduced world role as long as British forces were deployed. Like the nuclear bomb, British bases were a ‘ticket to the top table’ of nations (Hastings 9).

 

A turning point came in 1965 when the UN’s General assembly urged Britain and Argentina through Resolution 2065 to ‘proceed without delay with negotiations…with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem’ (Hastings and Jenkins 15).  So England, at last,  decided to negotiate with Argentina. Needless is to say that this was a major diplomatic success for Argentina. “These negotiations and the international auspices under which they were conducted gradually lent legitimacy to the Argentine claim. They implied that there was indeed an issue about which to negotiate and when they ran into an obstacle, notably islander resistance, Buenos Aires was enabled to feel a grievance” (Hastings and Jenkins 16). The negotiations started immediately and were kept mostly in secret.  As informed by Hastings and Jenkins, by 1967 the negotiations reached Foreign Ministry level and a meeting took place in New York. The British intended to win the islanders round by demonstrating the benefits which a link to the mainland would bring. The Argentines were happy to provide guarantees of continuity of customs and lifestyle. It was sovereignty, not a colony, which they craved. Meetings would continue to produce various heads of agreement. It was now two years into the negotiations and not a word had been said about them either to the British Parliament or in Port Stanley (the islands’ capital and most important city). The Foreign Office policy had been to prepare a satisfactory package of safeguards as well as economic benefits, to be presented to the islanders in such a way that the good news outweighed the bad (18).  This was probably the closest occasion in which Argentina and Britain almost solved the conflict through diplomatic means. Recently declassified Foreign Office documents reveal that, by 1968, a memorandum of understanding was in the final stages of drafting in which England would agree to handle back the islands to Argentina (Gerschenson).  The basis of the talks were ‘a transfer and lease-back’ based on the Hong Kong model or even a joint Angle-Argentine sovereignty known as condominium (Hastings and Jenkins 34). So, what happened then? Why couldn’t both countries reach and agreement amicably? In Argentina, it was because of the turbulent and dark times that would come during the 1970’s with the advent of the “Dirty War” and the bellicose attitude of the military dictators. On the British side, as explained in The Battle for the Falklands, “A compromise settlement was never achieved because the British Foreign Office proved far more competent in negotiating with another government than with its own. Successive cabinets regarded the political price of compromising always just too high”. In Britain, diplomats failed to lobby politicians, to “sell them” policies which considered viable for them to implement. Also, the Foreign Ministers were never long enough in office or were never sufficiently interested to do the job of  “selling a compromise”. The flaw was that a political strategy  was  never evolved  to  complement  a diplomatic  one. Diplomacy  without  politics is ultimately impotent (Hastings and Jenkins 325-326).

In spite of the continuous ups and downs in the bilateral negotiations, a “Communications Agreement” was signed between the two countries in 1971. The same stipulated, among other things, that an airstrip would be built by England (it was ultimately built by Argentina) and that it would be run by Argentina. This would provide a fast and steady communication with the continent, which was a big improvement because, until then, the islanders only had a monthly supply boat coming from England. This change also brought many other benefits like the possibility of higher education and better medical assistance in Argentina, besides of lots of tourism which improved the islands’ economy. The islands and the islanders’ well being had been pretty neglected until then. Almost all the land was owned by a monopolistic company called “Falkland Islands Company” with offices in London. This company was responsible for all the economy and virtually every islander was either its employee or working for the Government. Very little of the revenues obtained from the large sheep ranches was invested in the islands. The lifestyle was very low. The islanders had only elementary education and suffered from a chronic shortage of women which didn’t allow the population to grow, since many of the youngsters were fleeing the islands. Consequently, the islanders had three times Britain’s divorce rate and suffered from alcohol and depression problems. On top of that, they had been denied the British citizenship.  As argued by Hastings and Jenkins, the Shackelton Report of 1976 stated that “There was virtually no local or private sector. Almost everyone was employed either by the Falklands Islands Company of by the Government.” This had bred, in Shackelton’s words  “a lack of confidence and enterprise at the individual and community level, and a degree of acceptance of their situation which verges on apathy” (34).   Therefore, in spite of the initial reluctance, the 1971 agreement was welcomed by the islanders who saw their lifestyles improved dramatically. But meanwhile, the political scene was changing rapidly in Argentina. In 1973 General Perón, the old leader, returned from Spain after 18 years of exile to become Argentina’s President for the third time. With his coming, the old nationalistic ideals revived hardening Argentina’s policy towards the islanders which, until then, had been one of “winning hearts and minds”.  In spite of this fact, there was some progress still made. By 1974, Argentina’s oil company YPF started supplying the islands with fuel oil which is vital for heating due to the cold weather which prevails throughout the year. But Argentina was plunging deeper and deeper into chaos. After Perón’s death in 1974, his widow, the acting Vice President, took power only to worsen things more. The Communist guerilla, thousands of men strong, started an open war against the Government which wrecked both the economy and the society. It was the beginning of what is known as the “Dirty War”, a sad and obscure period in Argentina’s history plagued by violence, torture and death, during which about 30,000 Argentines “disappeared”. By 1976 the situation was desperate. The military, with a tacit approval and support from a vast segment of the society took the power though a coup. By then, it was clear that Argentina was far from being an ideal country to “be sold” to the islanders. Everything conspired to make the chances for a settlement grow smaller and smaller: the ever conflicting British internal politics , the increasing islanders’ pro British lobby and the chaos and violence reigning in Argentina. As pointed out on Argentine Malvinas on the Web, the lowest point in the bilateral relationship came in 1976 when both British and Argentine Ambassadors were called back and an Argentine warship fired an intimidating shot over the deck of a British ship. Still, reason prevailed and negotiations restarted in 1977.

But there were still many other factors which combined to form the complex chain of events that led to the war. In 1976, England sends to the islands what is known as the “Shackelton  Mission” to study the possibility of further economical development of the area. The report issued afterwards signals, among other things, the possibility of huge oil reserves in the area (it was confirmed recently). The possibility of oil exploitation was a powerful tool used by the islanders’ lobby to try to block further negotiations. Argentina, on the other side, was under a military dictatorship. The Argentine Navy, under Admiral Massera, started growing in political influence within the military Junta while also growing in size and power through the purchase of warships, submarines and airplanes. Another important fact pointed out by Hastings and Jenkins, was that Massera and his Navy colleagues had long been impressed by the military operation by which India overtook the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961, almost without any world condemnation . They believed that a swift and preferably bloodless operation against colonialism would be accepted as a fait accompli and began to harbor ideas to apply the same thing to the Falkland islands (31). It is widely accepted that a draft of the recovery of  the Argentine territory in the South Atlantic existed in the Argentine’s Navy headquarters since the late 1960’s, prepared or at least revised by a then young Navy Captain Jorge Anaya, who was the head of the Navy in 1982 (Hasting and Jenkins 31).  Admiral Anaya explained on a personal interview for the book The Fight for the ‘Malvinas’ that by 1981 there was a growing feeling among the Argentine military that 1982 would be “The Year of the Malvinas”, since it would mark the 150^th. anniversary of the British takeover of the islands by force. A contingency plan was made to take the islands followed by a voluntary withdrawal (it was later changed for a permanent garrisoning of the Argentine troops). This plan was made just in case the new round of negotiations with England, scheduled to start in the beginning of 1982, failed. The original purpose of the invasion was to bring forward the subject to the world and force the British to start serious negotiations once and for all (Middlebrook 2-3).  As explained by Admiral Busser, Commander of the landing force: “We were told to be prepared to continue the planning right up to the last three months of the year. I have to stress it was truly a national plan, not just a military one, with the main emphasis always on recovering the islands by negotiations” (Middlebrook 6). How was the plan conceived? What was the reasoning behind it? The tentative target date was set for mid September of 1982. The reasons were, apart from letting diplomacy a chance, that the worst of the winter would be over, H.M.S. Endurance, a British patrol vessel, would have been withdrawn under planned British naval cuts, the training of the army conscripts, who were drafted every year for the period of service, would be well advanced and the re-equipment of the Air Force with state of the art French planes with exocet missiles (which would play a vital role during the war) would be complete (Middlebrook 5). The planning was kept so secret and among so few members of the armed forces that neither the British or American intelligence sources could discover or predict it.

Another strong fact that influenced the thinking of the ruling military in Argentina was the belief that the United States would either back Argentina politically or at least stay neutral during an eventual conflict. Because of the intense fight against the Communist guerillas during the 1970’s, Argentina not only became another Cold War battlefield but also a pivot for the American foreign policy to stem off the Communist threat in South America. The Argentine military not only played a major role in the domestic repression of the Communist insurgency but also became deeply involved in many Central American countries like Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua.  At the same time that many Argentine officers were sent to Central America as military advisors, Argentina became a training field for officers from those countries. This feeling, as argued by Hastings and Jenkins , was further enhanced by 1981 when Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. Suddenly, the Reagan Administration started “courting” the Argentine military more openly while turning its back on human right issues. Reagan’s top military advisers saw their Argentine counterparts as “fellow fighters” against Marxism in South America and held a vision of a new anti-Communist alliance in Latin America. Many military and CIA envoys started arriving in Buenos Aires and were received by the new chief of the Army, General Leopoldo Galtieri, who was Argentina’s President during the war. Galtieri, on his part, visited twice the United States and was widely praised. During his second visit, he had private meetings with top Capitol Hill people, among them Reagan’s Security Adviser Richard Allen (45-46).

The economy also played an indirect influence. The militaries, who had been in power since 1976, proved to be inefficient governors. The self proclaimed “Process of National Reorganization” had stalled between internal dissent within the Junta and the militaries’ inability to negotiate with the industrialists and the unions. The result was an economy plunging slowly into chaos. As reported by Hastings and Jenkins, by the time of the war, a new Economy Minister with liberal ideas was in charge and his economic measures were creating social tensions. The Junta was facing the first strikes and riots since 1976. It was therefore necessary to create a diversion (59). Certainly, the recovery of the islands, which was something very dear to most Argentines, would create that diversion and win the military political time to let the economic measures take effect. I remember being at the Plaza de Mayo on April 2^nd. 1982.  A  huge crowd had gathered in that historical square facing the “Casa Rosada” (House of Government). They were waving Argentine flags and cheering at the top of their lungs. It was the same crowd that had been battling the police and armed forces a week before. Everything was happening too fast, it was like a dream. Although I felt very happy, something deep inside me told me that beneath that collective hysteria there was something going very wrong. Finally, there’s the fact of public image. In spite of the heavy censorship imposed by the Junta, rumors about kidnapping, disappearing people, torture and detention centers (some of them were military bases) were becoming very strong. The military needed to clean up their public image and certainly a war could do the job. It is believed that, because of this, Colonel Alfredo Astiz was given the job of liberating the south Georgia islands, a dependency of the Falkland islands and also part of the sovereignty dispute. Astiz was deeply involved in the repression and was later accused, among other things, of having taken part in the torture and disappearing of four French nuns and a Swedish woman. He was nicknamed “Death’s Angel” for his boyish looks which masked his brutality.

But, was happening in England?  The Royal Navy, which had epitomized England’s power for centuries, was now plagued by a shameful low budget and cutbacks. According to Hastings and Jenkins, H.M.S. Hermes was scheduled for the scrap yard and H.M.S. Invincible had been sold to the Australians (both carriers took part on the war). Navy pay had fallen so low that many sailors based ashore were “moonlighting”, taking second jobs to increase their incomes. 1980 was the blackest year, with a total moratorium on defense contracts and fuel cuts so severe that many ships couldn’t put to sea for months (11). A fully naval operation like in the Falklands would certainly put the Royal Navy back to her former status. When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, she was reluctant to talk about sovereignty in the Falklands in view of Rhodesia’s experience. However, she sent a delegation to the islands in 1980 to sell the “lease-back” proposal, which obtained mixed results and nothing in concrete. The problem was that she would meet opposition in Parliament that she couldn’t afford, since she needed time and political backing to implement her liberal policies to reshape England’s decayed economy (Hastings and Jenkins 38-40). In a way, a war would unite the whole country behind her and buy her time and support for her policies. The complex combination of historical facts, political situations, economic interests, lack of patience, unwillingness for compromise, lack of proper communication and political ambitions on both sides of the Atlantic was slowly and inevitably setting both countries on the course of war. However, an unexpected incident triggered the war. Constantino Davidoff, an Argentine scrap metal businessman, had obtained a contract to dismantle an abandoned base in Grytviken, south Georgia island. Mr. Davidoff had fulfilled all the British regulations (which all the Argentine governments always found quite irksome) for landing and working there. As reported by Middlebrook, the party left on March 11^th. on the ship “Bahia Buen Suceso”. Upon arriving there, an Argentine flag was hoisted and some members of the party fired some shots, reportedly for sport shooting practice and for hunting some deer (which had been introduced to the islands many years ago for hunting). The British Magistrate at Grytviken reported the Argentine infringements by radio to the British Governor on the Falklands, Rex Hunt. Upon his request the flag was lowered. However, a few days later Governor Hunt radioes London again reporting the continuing failure of the Argentines at Grytviken to complete all the required formalities and also saying, incorrectly, that Argentine military personnel was among the working party. The British then send a ship with armed Royal Marines from the Falklands, which provokes an escalation of the conflict. This was further enhanced by an ultimatum given by the British Foreign Secretary a few days later, which infuriated the Junta and caused them to advance their plans for recovery of the islands (9-10).

There has been some controversy about the role of the working party sent to the south Georgia island. At first, it was suspected, and many people in Argentina believed it, that the incident had been orchestrated by the Junta to start the war. However, all the information gathered through the years seems to confirm that such an early start clearly contradicted all the plans conceived by the militaries. British author Martin Middlebrook, who traveled to Argentina to interview many militaries who took active part on the war for his book The Fight for the ‘Malvinas’ , also interviewed Captain Niella who was in charge of the working party. His conclusions were that

Captain Niella and the other Argentines on South Georgia could have been unwitting pawns in an Argentine effort to dent the British sovereignty in this area. But the provoking of a crisis so early in the year conflicted with the timetable of the Argentine ‘National Plan’ being developed. I cannot be certain that the crisis was deliberately engineered but I do not think it was. I think it was a normal commercial expedition which, through a combination of practical difficulties and Argentine irritation with British regulations was met by a British over-reaction… One of the strongest feelings I brought back from my visit to Argentina was that the British mishandled the incident (11 12).

 

Whatever were the real causes behind this incident there was still an invasion plan being developed. If the British can be blamed for their unwillingness to compromise, which made them back off from previous agreements and negotiations, the Argentine military bear the guilt of conceiving a war plan to achieve their goals instead of committing further to diplomatic negotiations. Could the war have been avoided? In retrospect, everything seems to be clear and understandable, but I firmly believe the war could have either been avoided or stopped. It was the lack of clear communication between London and Buenos Aires at the early stages of the crisis plus the political ambitions of both General Galtieri and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that hampered all the efforts to prevent this tragic war. Not even the last ditch efforts like the “Three Flag Option” (England, Argentina and the United Nations administering the islands) proposed by the United States and Peru, which reportedly may have included a secret “save face” plan to cede the islands back to Argentina in 15 years in exchange for a withdrawal of the Argentine troops, was accepted (Dawnay). In the words of John McDermott, who was a leading Seaman (Missile) aboard H.M.S. Plymouth during the conflict: “Yes, it was a totally unnecessary conflict fueled by the Junta in Argentina and a belligerent Prime Minister who abused her powers given to her by the trusting British public…My attitude was, as it is right now, that the conflict should never occurred. It was a total meaningless exercise that could have been avoided by the governments of the day…War was the worst option.”

This brief but fiercely fought war brought many consequences for all the parties involved, besides of the great loss of human life (about 1,000 servicemen killed from both countries and hundreds of others injured) and materiel. In England, Margaret Thatcher came out as the “Iron Lady” who led her country through a victorious war (probably England’s last colonial war). She won the time and support she required for her economic measures to take effect, which they did, and the British economy was dramatically transformed and reshaped. Needless is to say that the British  weakened national pride received a big boost of confidence and assurance. Finally, the Royal Navy proved her value once more and was able to keep her supremacy over the other armed forces, while also leaving behind the shameful low budget and cutbacks. The islanders were probably the ones who benefited more. They were finally given British citizenship, their lifestyle was improved by the investments England made after the war (an international airport, a high school, a new hospital, among other things) and the Falkland Islands Company’s monopoly was finally ended. Currently the islanders own most of the land. They were allowed to have their own flag and constitution, as a way for an eventual future independence. Argentina, as the loser, bore the worst part. The economy, which had been doing quite badly, was further shattered by the huge drain of reserves to pay for the war effort. Her international image and credibility were quite damaged also. The only good outcome of this war for Argentina was the return of democracy once and for all. The military, who had been hailed as the “moral reserve of the nation” for many decades, had completely lost their reputation. The times when many Argentine citizens would knock at the militaries’ doors demanding them to “straighten up things” (which usually meant a coup) were gone forever. The Argentine military not only proved to be bad governors but they also harmed the people they were supposed to protect. The rumors of the atrocities committed during the Dirty War were slowly coming to light. On top of that, the war veterans were returning home, some of them having an emaciated look which resembled more of concentration camp survivors than prisoners of war. They told stories of mismanagement, mistreatment by some officers, shortages of food and ammunition, broken weapons, misunderstanding and rivalry among the armed forces during the war. It was too much to bear apart from having lost the war. The militaries had to go and return to their quarters where they belonged. In addition to the horrors of the “Dirty War”, all this pain and suffering caused such a deep division in Argentina’s society that even still today the process of healing and reconciliation is going on.

The war solved the military issue but not the conflict itself. According to Hastings and Jenkins, on November 4 1982 Britain was faced with another U.N. resolution requesting a resumption of the negotiations. The United States was among the nations which voted in favor of this. Britain had won the war, but not yet the argument and the Falkland islands had become a costly fortress. The economic sanctions imposed by the European Community were lifted and, to Mrs. Thatcher’s annoyance, the military contracts were fulfilled by France (airplanes) and Germany (frigates). As it happens in many limited wars, the cause of the dispute returned to the status quo ante, wholly unresolved (327). Only in 1991, and thanks to the goodwill of some nations like Brazil, Spain and Switzerland the diplomatic relations were restored. Since then, Argentina and England enjoyed an improving bilateral relationship which currently could be described as excellent. Part of it was because both countries decided to open an “umbrella” on the sovereignty issue and leave it aside (but still unresolved), while concentrating on other matters of common interest. This proactive attitude proved to be very fruitful but the problem still remains. Britain’s traditional position, based on the fact that continued possession over a long period of time gives right to ownership, has moved to the principle of self determination of the people of the island. This position is shared by many Britons, as voiced by John McDermott:

… they (islanders) should be left alone and be free from the threat of further violence. This has got to be uppermost in any further negotiations that may take place. For this to be properly realized Argentina should consider dropping the claim of ownership to the Falklands to one of support for the islanders. The future of both the Falklands and Argentina will always be linked, so attitudes on both sides must be modified at the highest levels. Talk of the people, not of the land”.

 

To counter this, Argentina has the historical facts and treaties to which the sovereignty issued can be traced. Maybe the strongest fact was that England took the islands by force from a legitimate established government of which England had recognized its independence and territorial integrity. Regarding the self determination of the peoples, what is argued by Argentina was that, when England took the islands all the Argentine settlers were removed. Furthermore, England forbade by law Argentine immigration to the islands or any land purchase by Argentine citizens. If the present population of the islands were a mixture of various nationalities as a consequence of free immigration, the principle of self determination would have more strength. But it could be argued that the same had been artificially kept British or pro Anglo-Saxon. The Argentine position is basically to treat the land separately from the inhabitants, meaning to take into account the islanders’ interests and well being but not their determination.

There’s no question that this conflict has to be settled once and for all. Until then, no matter how good the Anglo-Argentine bilateral relationship may be, it will remain an open sore between the two countries. The only way to achieve this is through diplomatic negotiations. To make these negotiations fruitful, two basic conditions have to be met. The first one is to make the islanders be part of them, therefore making a three party negotiation: Argentina, England and the Falklanders. The second and most important one is that the three parties involved are willing to apply a sincere and honest attitude towards the negotiations and then fulfill what they had negotiated. In other words, “to make it happen”.

All the negotiations are based on the principle of compromise, and compromise means to be able to give something in order to obtain something. The three parts need to be aware that, in order to achieve a definite settlement, they will have to renounce to some of their aspirations. The key issues are: Argentina’s and England’s claims to sovereignty, the islanders’ welfare, their wish to remain British and their eventual quest for independence. There are two other important factors which are the fishing and oil exploitation issues.

Since Argentina’s claim on sovereignty remains unshakable, but the possibility of renouncing to it or giving independence to the islands has always to be taken into account, I’m considering another, though not less difficult scenario, which is the partial and/or gradual cession of sovereignty to Argentina. How could this be possible? Basically, because if before the war the British were willing to give the islands to Argentina at some time and under certain concessions, it would be eventually less difficult to try to go back to that point than to negotiate an independence for the islands. By then, the most viable option seemed to be a “lease-back” on the Hong Kong model. However, the scenario has changed a lot since the war. The British have spent billions of dollars in the war, they have shed their blood to retain the islands, have made some major investments there and are spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year to defend and sustain them. Therefore, it is obvious that the British won’t just simply walk away from the islands without some gains. The islanders, on their part, are much better off than before the war, though they still depend on the connection to the continent for their continuous well being . They are now British citizens and have all the right to feel apprehension for Argentina. After all, they had been invaded by an army and their lifestyle had been disrupted. They have lived on the islands for many generations and the land they own is rightfully theirs. However, if they have reassurances from Britain that their lifestyle and culture could be preserved while obtaining more benefits in the meantime, there could be a chance for a negotiation. The hardest part is finding a way in which all the parties can be truly benefited from the outcome of the negotiations.

The 99 year “lease-back” option after which Argentina’s sovereignty would be recognized seems a good possibility. However, I believe there are some other factors and/or additions that could help the negotiations. Another possibility would be a certain period of joint Anglo-Argentine sovereignty with the islanders’ participation during which a gradual cession of sovereignty could be discussed, bearing the following conditions:

-At the end of the joint period any islander who would not want to live in the islands would be fully compensated by Argentina and relocated in England (if he or she so wished).

-The islanders would remain British citizens. Also, if they chose, they could have Argentine citizenship.

-The islanders’ descendants would have the right to British citizenship, say for 3 generations.

-Argentina would let the islanders choose their way of government, keep their language and culture.

-The currency system would be dual sharing both British Pounds and Argentine Pesos.

-A joint Argentine-Falklander committee would be established, with offices both in Port Stanley and Buenos Aires, to manage matters of common interest like oil and fishing exploitation, ecology, tourism , cultural exchange, sports events, etc.

-The islanders would choose their own Senators to represent them in the Argentine Congress like any other Argentine province does.

-They would have their constitution and flag.

-The islands could have some kind of special arrangement/status to be a part of the British Commonwealth.

-The official name would be “Falkland Islands” in English and “Islas Malvinas” in Spanish.

-The defense of the islands would be done by British or NATO troops (no Argentine troops preferably).

-All the parties, including England, would be partners in the oil and fishing exploitation.

-Argentina would not levy any kind of taxes on the islands or the islanders.

-Argentina would provide massive investment on the islands in infrastructure, communications and health care among other things in order to upgrade the islanders’ quality of life while, at the same time, would not attempt to “colonize” the islands by settling thousands of Argentines. Integration would come gradually and slowly.

-Argentina could give the South Georgia  and South Sandwich islands to England.

In summary, what I basically propose is that, at the end of whatever period of either lease-back or joint sovereignty administration, the islands would become an associated province of Argentina with a special status guaranteeing the preservation of their culture and language, similar to what the province of Québéc has in Canada. 

What would each party win and lose?

Argentina: She would finally achieve her goal of sovereignty on the islands. What would be the drawbacks? Not being able to achieve it immediately or completely; giving the South Georgia and South Sandwich islands to England; having British or NATO troops stationed on the islands; having to share the revenues of the oil and fishing exploitations which, under other circumstances, should have been entirely her sovereign rights.

The islanders: What will they win: the end of their isolation; a better quality of life (infrastructure, food, communications, health care, access to higher education in the continent, etc); they would still be British citizens with an option to another citizenship if they so wished; technological  investment on farming (the Argentine ranches in the Patagonia have a similar environment); vast amounts of revenues coming from the oil exploitation and fishing contracts; the possibility of diversifying the economy; revenues coming from tourism; the end of the population decrease or migration, etc. What will they lose? Their quest for independence.

England: What will she lose? The claim on sovereignty on the islands; maybe a little bruised national pride. What will she win? She will have the South Georgia and South Sandwich islands for an eventual military base in order to keep a global presence and as a stop over for supplying her Antartic bases; a shedding of colonial image; saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year from the defense and sustain of the islands; revenues coming from oil exploitation (the deal could be further “sweetened” to make Shell have right of the oil exploitation, for instance); an even improved relationship with Argentina (England has invested around 3 billion dollars in Argentina in the recent years after the reconciliation started) which could lead to further concessions in bilateral and economical negotiations. Furthermore, she will have a very important ally and a “big door” to the Mercosur which is growing year after year and some day will also include Chile and Bolivia.

Eighteen years have passed since I took that train ride and asked myself so many questions I was not able to answer. I chose to write this paper in order to find all the answers I had been looking for. It involved not only too much investigation but also a lot of wondering and soul searching. It  meant recalling and settling old, sometimes very sad, memories. In a way, I think I was quite successful, I’m more convinced now than I was then that the islands belong to Argentina. However, the most important thing I learned was the need to listen to somebody else’s opinion, to understand it and respect it, to be open minded and willing to engage in a sincere and frank argument and to do anything to avoid the use of violence, which only causes pain, hate and sorrow. As posted by John McDermott in the Falklands-Malvinas Forum:

…I know our views are understandable when mixed with our  feelings and passions but there’s also a philosophy of balance, which appears to be sadly neglected. This philosophy, to my mind, is non-political and requires an earnest attempt by us all in order to detach ourselves from our national ties, allowing us to look deeper into our moral and intellectual selves. I would wish we co-operated to find a better peace and use this forum time that we have in its search.

We all have different answers, and so we should have, for no one person holds the truth or can even explain the meaning of justice. What we have though, is a shared spirit, which drives our energies into finding those key elements of truth and justice. Would finding a balance be a way to quicken this quest? This balance is a ‘middle way’, observing and understanding the rights and wrongs of both opposing sides. We have nothing to lose by this and everything to gain. In any event, my life has told me that rights and wrongs are often illusions that create suspicion, which leads to hate and eventual violence. I would wish the opposite (“Philosophy of Balance”).

 

Finally, as I struggle to find the closing words for this paper, part of an old song echoes in my mind: “You may say I’m a dreamer/ but I’m not the only one/ I hope some day you join us/ and the world will live as one” (Lennon).

                          

WORKS CITED

Argentine Malvinas on the Web (Malvinas Argentinas en la Web).
Official home page of the Argentine war veterans. 20 March 2000.
<http://www.malvinas.com>

Dawnay, Ivo. “Falklands handover was set for 1997”. Electronic Telegraph. 29 June 1997
Daily Telegraph 29 June 1997. 26 March 2000
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=139…atmo=ttttttt/et/97/6/29wfalk29.html>

Etchebarne Bullrich, Conrado. Malvinas or Falklands?. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano 2000. 28 April 2000.
<http://www.americanos.org/Malvinas.htm>

Falklands-Malvinas Forum. Internet forum sponsored by Inter-Mediacion, Inc., dedicated to conflict solving.
<http://www.Falklands-Malvinas.com/>

Gerscheron, Ana, (2000) “El día en que Londres pensó en devolver las Malvinas”. (“The day London thought about returning the Falklands”). Clarín digital 23 March 2000. Diario Clarín (Buenos Aires) 23 March 2000. 5 May 2000.
< http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2000-03-23/t-01601d.htm>

Hastings, Max and Simon Jenkins.(1984) The Battle for the Falklands. (London: W.W. & Norton Company Inc.), 1983. 2^nd American ed. (New York: W.W. & Norton Company Inc.)

Lennon, John. Imagine. EMI Records Limited, 1971.

McDermott, John. (Email interview). 28 April 2000.
“Philosophy of Balance”. Online posting. 20 April 2000. 21 April 2000.
< http://gentoo.net/engboard.mv?parm_func=showmsg+parm_msgnum=1003500>

Middlebrook, Martin. The Fight for the ‘Malvinas’. The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War. London, 1989. 2^nd. ed. London: Penguin Books, 1990.

 

WORKS CONSULTED

Turolo, Carlos M. De Isabel a Videla (From Isabel to Videla). (1996) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana)

Urioste Federico, (1993)  Hundan al Belgrano (Sink the Belgrano)/Rule Britannia. (Anglo-Argentine documentary: Filmarte)  117 min.

Perez, Miguel (1983), Dir.  La República Perdida I (The Lost Republic I). Argentine documentary,. 146 min.

Perez, Mnd Proposed Ideas for a Negotiated Settlementiguel (1986), Dir. La República Perdida II (The lost Republic II). Argentine documentary,

 

 

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